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| Entrenchment hypothesis ： ウィキペディア英語版 |
Management entrenchment
Management is a type of labor but with a special role-coordinating the activities of inputs and carrying out the contracts agreed among inputs, all of which can be characterized as "decision making." Managers usually face disciplinary forces by making themselves irreplaceable in a way that the company would lose without them. A manager has an incentive to invest the firm’s resources in assets whose value is higher under him than under the best alternative manager, even when such investments are not value-maximizing.
== The Managerial Entrenchment Theory ==
When managers hold little equity and shareholders are too dispersed to take action against non-value maximization behavior, insiders may deploy corporate assets to obtain personal benefits, such as shirking and perquisite consumption. When ownership and control is divided within a company, agency costs arise. However agency costs decline if the ownership within the company increases as managers are responsible for a larger cost of these shares. On the other hand, given ownership to a manager within a company may translate into greater voting power which makes the manager's work place more secure. Hence, they gain protection against takeover threats and the current managerial market.
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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